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There has been considerable interest recently in disclosure re-
quirements for the sale of state and local government securities. The
severe financial distress experienced by New York City and its conse-
quent failure to pay certain of its obligations as they became due have
focused particular attention on municipal bond disclosure matters.'
Charges have been made that New York City engaged for years in fi-
nancial flim-flam, and that its true financial picture was hidden from
the investing public.2 In recent months, the Securities and Exchange
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The authors wish to express appreciation to Mr. Steven Gilford for his contributions
to this Article, especially with respect to the application of the recklessness standard of
libel law to rule lob-5.
[AUTHORS' NOTE: Since the completion of this Article, Franke v. Midwestern
Oklahoma Dev. Authority, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,786 (W.D. Okla. 1976), has been decided, bearing out the observation of the authors
that bond counsel issuing the legal opinion only with respect to legality of bond obliga-
tions and the tax-exempt status of the bonds has no responsibility under the federal
securities laws for the accuracy of the offering circular. The court made its ruling on a
motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff's claim that bond counsel had either
directly violated rule lob-5 or aided and abetted a violation by other parties.]
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Act];
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970) [hereinafter cited as
1934 Act];
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (June 4,
1975) [hereinafter cited as Securities Reform Act of 1975];
Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Rule lob-5].
1. The New York situation has been described generally in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, NEw YORK CITY'S FISCAL PROBLEM: ITS ORIGINS, POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS,
AND SOME ALTERNATIVE POLICY RESPONSES (Background Paper No. 1, Oct. 10, 1975),
reprinted in full, Hearings on S. 1833, S. 1862, S. 2372, S. 2514 and S. 2523, New York
City Financial Crisis Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 509-48 (1975); JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 94TH CONG., lST SESS.,
NEW YORK CITY'S FINANCIAL CRISIS: AN EVALUATION OF ITS ECONOMIC IMPACT AND OF
PROPOSED POLICY SOLUTIONS (Comm. Print 1975); Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves
a City: The New York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119.
2. A detailed discussion of problems in New York City's budgeting system can be
found in Robertson & Vecchio, A Legal History of Expense Budgeting in New York
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Commission has undertaken an investigation into sales of New York
City's obligations, an investigation which the City has sued to curtail
on constitutional grounds.'
Legislation has been introduced in both the Senate and the House
(but not adopted in either chamber) to require substantial issuers of
municipal bonds to file extensive disclosure statements prior to issuing
securities. 4 In response to the public concern in this area, the Munici-
pal Finance Officers Association has distributed, in draft form, sug-
gested disclosure standards for use by municipal issuers.'
This increased interest in full disclosure in municipal bond issues
has focused new attention on the role of bond counsel. Certain SEC
officials and some courts have expressed the view that discipline of
lawyers holds a key to prevention of many securities misdeeds." Thus,
it is not surprising that questions have been raised about bond counsel's
responsibility for disclosure. Bond counsel have, in fact, been included
as defendants in several recent SEC enforcement proceedings.' Bond
counsel have begun to consider whether they may be required by fed-
eral law to undertake a "due diligence" type examination8 to insure
that there is proper disclosure of all material facts in bond issues for
which they give an approving opinion. In light of this concern, this
Article will consider the historical role of bond counsel, the possible
legal bases for imposition of securities law responsibilities, and some
of the practical problems which bond counsel are likely to face in this
regard.
City, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1 (1975). See also Lodal, Improving Local Government
Financial Information Systems, 1976 DUKE LJ. 1133.
3. City of New York v. SEC, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,667 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(complaint). The issues in New York v. SEC are thoroughly discussed in Comment,
Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities: A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis,
1976 DUKE L.J. 1261, 1310. A similar suit, also challenging the constitutionality of
federal investigation of local governmental securities dealings, has been filed by the City
of Philadelphia. THE WEEKLY BOND BUYER, Aug. 9, 1976, at 1.
4. S. 2969, S. 2574, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); H.R. 15205, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1975).
5. MUNICIPAL FINANCE OFFICERS ASS'N, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR OFFERINGS
OF SECURITIES BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Exposure Draft, Nov. 10, 1975).
A revised version of the disclosure guidelines will be published by the M.F.O.A. in Janu-
ary, 1977. 51 MUNICIPAL FINANCE OFFICERS ASS'N NEWSLETrER 101 (1976).
6. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); Address
by SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., "The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securi-
ties Lawyer," [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,631 (January,
1974).
7. SEC v. Astro Prod. of Kansas, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7557 (Sept. 13,
1976); SEC v. Reclamation Dist. No. 2090, SEC Litigation Release No. 7460 (June 22,
1976); SEC v. Ferguson, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974). For
a discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 114-19 infra.
8. See notes 37-45 infra and accompanying text.
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THE ROLE OF BOND COUNSEL
The issuance of state and local governmental obligations is cus-
tomarily accompanied by a favorable legal opinion of an individual or
firm expert in municipal finance law, known as a bond counsel. It is,
in fact, uncommon for any but very small issues of municipal bonds
not to be accompanied by such an opinion. The role played by bond
counsel is, however, frequently not fully understood. The services his-
torically performed by bond counsel have differed considerably from
the services of counsel in corporate financings. An understanding of
the role of bond counsel is therefore essential to a consideration of the
bond counsel's obligations under federal securities laws.
The unique character of the bond counsel's role derives from his-
torical practice. Nineteenth century abuses in the incurring of local
government debt led many states to impose stringent constitutional and
statutory limitations on the power to incur governmental debt.' In a
number of instances, courts actually relieved issuers from their obli-
gations with regard to. improperly issued bonds by declaring the bonds
void.' o
To protect against the unsettling possibility of purchasing void ob-
ligations, it became the practice for potential purchasers of municipal
bonds to submit a copy of a transcript of the issuer's proceedings con-
cerning the-bonds to an expert in municipal law for an opinion as to
the binding character of the bonds." This "bond counsel" served es-
sentially as an independent legal expert-not as the regular counsel for
any of the parties to the transaction. The bond counsel's opinion was
based on a review of the transcript and was limited to the validity of
the debt instruments."a
The Scope of Representation
The current role of bond counsel still reflects these historical ante-
9. For a classic examination of the early history of state and local debt and the
needed development of debt limitations, see B. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS
(1941). An overview of current state constitutional and statutory debt limitations is
presented in U.S. ADvisoRy COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, UNDER-
STANDING TE MARKET FOR STATE AND LOCAL DEBT 44-53 (1976). There are problems
with these limitations, and their efficacy has been questioned. See sources cited in
Blaydon & Gilford, Financing the Cities: An Issue Agenda, 1976 DUKE W. 1057, 1088
n.127.
10. See 15 E. McQumuN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.28 (3d ed.
rev. 1970). See generally B. RATCHFORD, supra note 9.
11. See generally Guandolo, Municipal Bond Counsel, in JOINT ECONoMIC COMM.,
89TH CoNG., 2D SEss., 2 STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FACILITY NEEDS AND FINANCING:
PUBLIC FACiLrrY FINANCING 207 (H. Comm. Print 1966).
12. L. CuERmAX, THE LAw OF REvENuE BONDS 63-67 (1954).
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cedents. In most instances, bond counsel does not serve as a lawyer
with overall transactional responsibility for any party. Rather, the bond
counsel serves as a special counsel for the limited purpose of rendering
an opinion as to the validity and tax-exempt character of the securi-
ties.1"
The situation is, of course, seldom this straightforward. Most
commonly, the bond counsel is retained by the issuer. 4 Counsel cus-
tomarily determines what matters must be included in the transcript
and usually prepares a number of the more important of the transcript
documents.' 5 In some cases, bond counsel may also provide the issuer
with advice on financing alternatives and requirements. Each of these
activities arises from the requirements of giving an approving legal
opinion.
Sometimes, especially in negotiated sales of revenue bonds, bond
counsel is retained not by the issuer but by an underwriter. In this situ-
ation, bond counsel may also serve as the underwriter's counsel with
regard to all aspects of a bond transaction.'
The Opinion
The nature of the opinion rendered by bond counsel is also de-
rived from historical practice. In general, the legal opinion is closely
tailored to a well-established form, narrow in scope and restricted as
to basis. The typical opinion states that the counsel has examined a
certified copy of the transcript of proceedings authorizing the bonds as
well as one of the executed bonds, and that, based on this examination,
the lawyer is of the opinion that the securities are legal and binding
obligations of the issuer. Where appropriate, the opinion will also des-
ignate any specific funds that have been pledged and state that interest
on the obligations is presently exempt from federal income taxes.
13. Even within the bond counsel community, attorneys differ as to who is the bond
counsel's client. Some hold that the client is the holder of the bonds, who presumably
relies on the bond counsel's opinion in acquiring the bonds. Probably the more realistic
and accurate view, however, is that the client is the party who retains and pays for the
bond counsel's services.
14. See generally Guandolo, supra note 11, at 213.
15. The transcript in a municipal bond transaction generally includes copies of the
bond proceedings, resolutions, ordinances, and election documents, if any, as well as
certificates as to various facts. See Guandolo, supra note 11, at 209. In order to assure
the satisfaction of legal requirements, bond counsel may draft the needed resolutions,
ordinances, election documents and certificates for the issuer.
16. As will be seen, to the extent that bond counsel perform services beyond those
directly related to their opinion-giving function, they will tend to encounter more




Bond counsel's opinion contrasts sharply with the customary legal
opinion rendered in regulated sales of corporate securities. As noted
previously, the opinion rendered on a municipal security is explicitly
confined to an examination of the issuer's record of proceedings. This
record consists of certified copies of the minutes and resolutions of the
issuing governmental body-such as a city council-and of certificates
as to various facts prepared by public officers. In contrast, legal opin-
ions in corporate issues may state that they are "based upon such docu-
ments, records and matters of law as [counsel] have considered to be rele-
vant."'17 Unlike their corporate colleagues, bond counsel do not repre-
sent that they have gone beyond a formal review of the documents.
Not only is bond counsel's legal opinion narrowly based, its reach
is also typically narrow. The scope of the opinion is normally limited
to the legal validity of the obligations, the bondholders' claim upon
funds pledged to their payment and the tax-exempt status of the bonds.
Unlike the practice of many corporate counsel, bond counsel rarely par-
ticipate in the drafting of the official statement (the sales document
in municipal bond issues which performs roughly the same function as
the offering circular and prospectus in issues of corporate securities),
and their opinions do not normally cover the accuracy or completeness
of the representations in the official statement.' 8 Again, this contrasts
with the typical corporate opinion which may state that the form of the
registration statement complies with statutory requirements and SEC
rules and that, based upon conferences with the company's representa-
tives, counsel does not believe that the prospectus contains any untrue
statement of a material fact or omits any material fact necessary to
make the prospectus not misleading.' 9
The role of bond counsel is therefore a limited one in most muni-
cipal bond transactions. Bond counsel do not represent parties to the
transaction generally. Their opinion is based primarily on a transcript
review and is narrowly drawn, covering only the validity of the security.
17. For other illustrative statements of the scope of the legal opinion in corporate
offerings, see Cheek, Potential Liability of Counsel Named in a Prospectus, reprinted in
SECURITMES LAW REvimw-1973 at 203, 210-11 (E. Folk ed.).
18. For tax-exempt industrial development bonds, bond counsel's legal opinion varies
somewhat from the standard model. See notes 26-28 infra and accompanying text. Here,
the bond counsel's opinion may be somewhat more extensive. The bond counsel may
opine that the bonds are exempt from registration requirements under the 1933 Act. See
note 47 infra. Bond counsel may also opine as to the accuracy of those portions of the
offering circular which describe the bonds and the principal documents securing the
bonds.
19. For a general discussion of the lawyer's opinion used in a typical SEC registered
corporate security, see Cheek, supra note 17, at 207-15.
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Unlike their corporate colleagues, bond counsel do not usually prepare
the prospectus or opine as to its accuracy or completeness.
Involvement of Other Counsel
Given the limited role of bond counsel, it may seem surprising that
the bond counsel's opinion is the only legal opinion which is delivered
in many municipal issues. The issuer's regular attorney usually partici-
pates in the transaction and, for revenue bonds, may opine on title and
other questions concerning security for the bonds.2 0 But the issuer's
counsel does not normally express any opinion as to the official state-
ment's accuracy or sufficiency or as to the validity of the bonds.2
Moreover, in the majority of municipal bond issues (other than
for the industrial development revenue type of bonds), underwriters
are not represented by outside counsel.22 Presumably, the very low
rate of municipal defaults,23 the fact that municipal bond underwriters
have not frequently been the targets of securities litigation, and the
comparatively smaller profit spread in municipal issues24 all lead under-
writers to avoid the expense of outside counsel. While it is currently
becoming somewhat more common for underwriters to obtain counsel
in larger negotiated bond sales, this practice still remains less common
than might be supposed.26
It should be noted, however, that there is usually no lack of legal
representation in municipal issues involving industrial development rev-
20. See generally L. CHERMAK, supra note 12, at 63.
21. This is presumably because lawyers specializing in general municipal law are not
usually regarded as having sufficient expertise in this area. Bond counsel expertise is
concentrated in a relatively few law firms. In general, such firms are large and are
clustered in regional financial centers. See Guandolo, supra note 11, at 214-16;
DIRECTORY OF MUNICIPAL BOND DEALERs oF THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1971).
22. It is not uncommon for underwriters to have staff counsel look over offering
circulars, but their counsel does not typically undertake the kind of due diligence
examination which would be conducted in a registered offering.
23. See J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 184-85 (1969);
U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERcOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 9, at 23-27.
In the early 1970s, less than 0.4% of the total outstanding municipal indebtedness was
in default.
24. See J. MAXWELL, supra note 23, at 190-92.
25. While some may be surprised at the absence of legal opinions on securities law
matters in such transactions, it may, in fact, make perfectly good sense in the majority of
cases. In most public purpose (i.e., non-industrial development) municipal issues,
the expertise of a lawyer is needed primarily for ascertaining the bond's validity.
The financial consultant or underwriter may well be more knowledgeable about those
matters which require disclosure. Given the very low rate of default in such municipal
obligations, see note 23 supra, one may fairly question whether the extensive cost, borne
by the taxpayers, of having counsel examine official statements for accuracy or complete-
ness in thousands of smaller bond issues would in fact be worth the possible return
in preventing investor loss. See also note 121 infra.
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enue bonds. 26  These are bonds issued by a governmental unit to fi-
nance a non-governmental project such as an industrial pollution con-
trol facility. Such bonds are payable, not from public funds, but from
revenues derived from the company or institution for which the pro-
ceeds are utilized.27 Here, in addition to bond counsel, lawyers for the
issuer, the underlying obligor (the company or institution which is to
provide the revenues) and the underwriters are all actively involved.
Because the security for these bonds depends not on the credit of the
issuer but on the credit of the private underlying obligor and because
of the obvious analogy to registered securities, underwriters generally
find it prudent to undertake a due diligence investigation and to employ
expert counsel on their behalf in these transactions.28
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The fact that bond counsel may be the only lawyers rendering any
legal opinion in many municipal bond issues suggests the question of
whether bond counsel are responsible, notwithstanding the limited na-
ture of their services, for examining the accuracy and completeness of
the representations in the selling documents. Obviously, the starting
point for such consideration is the text of the federal securities laws.
While municipal bond issues are generally exempt from all but the
basic anti-fraud sections of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the regulatory framework established by these
acts is instructive in considering the obligations of bond counsel.
26. See generally Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal
dismissed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938); Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin. Authority,
273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968); L. MOAK & A. HILLHOUSE, CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 261-65 (1975); Investment Bankers Ass'n,
Industrial Plants Financed and Owned by Local Governments, in JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1 STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FACILITY NEEDS AND
FINANCING: PUBLIC FACILITY NEEDS 690-93 (1966); Pinsky, State Constitutional Limi-
tations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U.
PA. L. REV. 265 (1963).
27. Section 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code restricts the scope of the tax
exemption granted for these bonds. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(c). In addition to
its direct financial importance to the underlying obligor, the tax exemption has important
securities law significance, since industrial development bonds are normally exempt from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 only if they are exempt from
the federal income tax under section 103(c). 1933 Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a)(2) (1970). Seenote47infra.
28. In some limited instances, section 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970),
may also be relevant in causing underwriters of industrial development issues to exercise
due diligence. See note 47 infra. Also, see notes 35, 42-44 infra and accompanying text
on the operation of section 12 and its due diligence requirement.
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The 1933 Act
The Securities Act of 1933 imposes substantial duties of full and
fair disclosure on certain persons in connection with the issuance of reg-
ulated securities. This is accomplished principally by its registration
statement and prospectus requirements.2" Under both statute and
rule, the prospectus and the registration statement must contain de-
tailed information about the issuer which is likely to be relevant to an
investment decision. 0
The 1933 Act also provides for a carefully arranged pattern of
civil remedies and penalties to protect the investor's right to disclosures
which are not misleading. Section 11 of the Act3' imposes strict li-
ability on issuers of non-exempt securities32 for material untruths in the
registration statement, for failure to disclose certain required material
facts, and for failure to disclose matters which are necessary to make
the representations not misleading. Section 11 liability may also be im-
posed on underwriters of such securities and on certain company of-
ficers and directors or persons controlling the underwriter or the is-
suer.3   Under certain circumstances, experts named with their consent
in the registration statement are also subject to section 11 liability as
to matters within their area of expertise. 34 In addition, section 12(2)
29. 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
30. The requirements concerning amount and type of information to be included in
registration statements were initially established by the 1933 Act. See 1933 Act § 7, 15
U.S.C. § 77g (1970) (registration statement); Schedules A and B, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa
(1970) (schedule of information for registration statement); 1933 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. §
77j (1970) (prospectus). Sections 7 and 10(c) also authorized the SEC to require
additional information in the registration statement and the prospectus by rule. This has
been done in SEC Regulation C, art. 1-2, Rules 400-494, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-.494
(1976), governing the requirements for registration statements and prospectuses.
31. 1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Since the purpose of this portion of
the Article is only to describe the federal regulatory scheme generally, as it may be
instructive for bond counsel, no detailed discussion of the precise scope and exact
limitations of this right to recover is appropriate. It should be emphasized that the
liability provisions of section 11 are sophisticated; they represent careful congressional
compromise and do not yield to simplifications. See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 26-27 (Conference Report 1933). Compare S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
4-6 (1933), with H.R. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933). A more detailed
discussion of the scope of purchasers' rights under section 11 may be found in Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 1
(1969).
32. Section 3(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1970), exempts certain
securities from the registration and prospectus requirements of the 1933 Act. See notes
46-47 in ra and accompanying text for a discussion of the exemption for municipal
bonds. See also 1933 Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970) (exempting certain transac-
tions).
33. 1933 Act H§ 11(a), 15, 15 U.S.C. §H 77k(a), 77o (1970).
34. 1933 Act § 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1970). In part, those who may
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imposes civil liability for offers or sales of securities made pursuant to
a prospectus or oral communication which is false or contains material
omissions.35 While section 11 applies to certain specifically stated per-
sons, section 12 applies only to "sellers. 36
Due Diligence and the Statutory Liability of Lawyers
Sections 11 and 12 establish so-called "due diligence" defenses
to the liability of persons other than the issuer (who under section 11
is an absolute guarantor of the material accuracy of the registration
statement). 7  The precise language of the defense is important. Un-
der section 11, such a defendant is not liable as to most matters if it
is shown that the defendant "after reasonable investigation, had rea-
sonable ground to believe, and did believe," that the challenged state-
ments in the registration statement were true and that no material omis-
sion was made.38  The standard is different, however, as to representa-
tions expertised by others or statements which purport to be made by
public officials or to be copied or extracted from an official public docu-
ment.39 In these cases, there is no requirement of "reasonable investi-
gation." Rather, the defendant need only show that "he had no rea-
sonable grounds to believe and did not believe" that the representa-
tions were untrue or misleading because of a material omission,40 or,
in the case of an official document, that the material was not fairly pre-
sented.41
This distinction between types of due diligence defenses under
section 11 is important to an understanding of bond counsel's securities
be liable for the accuracy of the registration statement are determined by 1933 Act § 6,
15 U.S.C. § 77f (1970), which identifies specific parties, including the issuer and its
chief financial and executive officers, who must sign the registration statement.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
36. See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
37. Section 11 of the 1933 Act makes its due diligence defenses available to any
person "other than the issuer." 1933 Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970). The
issuer is therefore strictly liable for any injury caused by a material misstatement or
omission in the registration statement.
A due diligence defense is available to the issuer under section 12, however, which
provides that a seller can avoid liability by proving "that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission." 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970). Nevertheless, it should be noted that in many cases the issuer
can be held strictly liable for misstatements or omissions in the prospectus since the bulk
of its information will also be included in the registration statement. See 1933 Act § 7,
Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77g, 77aa (1970).
38. 1933 Act § 11(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1970).
39. See 1933 Act §§ 11(b)(3)(B)-(D), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b)(3)(B)-(D) (1970).
40. Id.
41. See 1933 Act § ll(b)(3)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(D) (1970).
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law responsibilities. In the case of public documents and statements
made by public officials, there is no requirement of a reasonable inves-
tigation in order to establish the defense. Rather, there is only the re-
quirement that one not have reason to believe that the representation
in question is false. Since the typical bond counsel opinion is based
on public official documents and statements which give rise to a lesser
duty of care under the section 11 due diligence defense, it would be
highly surprising were the provision of the 1933 Act used, by analogy,
to require bond counsel to conduct a further "reasonable investigation."
Where Congress wished to impose duties of investigation as a condition
of a defense, it did so in an express and limited fashion. Its failure
to impose such duties with respect to public official documents is there-
fore relevant in considering the duties of bond counsel.
The "due diligence" defense under section 12(2) is phrased
somewhat differently. To establish the defense here, the burden is on
the seller to show that it did not know and "in the exercise of reason-
able care could not have known of the untruth or omission."42 Section
12 should not pose a substantial threat of liability to counsel since
it imposes liability only on the seller of a security. Under current case
law, a lawyer who does nothing more than perform legal services is not
a seller within the meaning of section 12.43
42. 1933 Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
43. See Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Nicewarner v.
Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 266 (D. Colo. 1965); Wonneman v. Stratford Securities Co.,
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 91,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
An attorney who undertakes more than the performance of legal services in
connection with a securities transaction and actually begins to assist in the sale may be
exposed to the argument that he too is a seller and may be held to answer for such
further, non-legal services as he performed. See notes 101-14 infra and accompanying
text.
A lawyer may also be subject to certain liabilities for statements in his or her
opinion when the opinion is included in a registration statement with the lawyer's
consent. Under section 11 (a) (4), the liability of experts applies to:
any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who
has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of
the registration statement . . . with respect to the statement in such registra-
tion statement . . . which purports to have been prepared or certified by him.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (4) (1970).
Since Schedule A, id. § 77aa, requires that a registration statement contain "a copy of the
opinion or opinions of counsel in respect to the legality of the issue" and section 7, id. §
77g, is understood to require that counsel issuing the opinion consent to being named in
the registration statement and to the use of the opinion letter, the lawyer may well be
subject to expert status with respect to the accuracy of an opinion letter included in the
registration statement. This liability as to expertised matters would, of course, be
subject to the due diligence defense. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
Counsel can best protect themselves from section 11 liability by careful drafting of
their opinions. The opinion required of counsel under Schedule A and section 7 can be
carefully drawn and narrow in application. However, attorneys have not always done so
1214
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Finally, it must be kept in mind that the due diligence provisions
of sections 11 and 12 are defenses to causes of action which are explic-
itly authorized by the Act. These sections do not make it unlawful
not to make a reasonable investigation or not to use due diligence. In
fact, persons subject to the requirements of the 1933 Act could com-
pletely ignore the contents of a registration statement, and if by chance
it should contain no untrue statements or omissions of required material
fact, such persons would not have violated sections 11 or 12 or
breached any duty under those sections. 4
Under the 1933 Act, then, the lawyer performing legal services
and not acting as a principal in a transaction may be subject to liability
only as an expert and only as to the legal opinion which is used in the
registration statement. It has been held that a lawyer is not an "ex-
pert" as to a prospectus as a result of having participated in its draft-
ing.4 5
Exemption for Municipal Bonds:
Limited Obligations of Municipal Bond Counsel
Even this limited potential for imposing liability on attorneys with
respect to the registration and prospectus requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933, however, is inapplicable to lawyers serving as municipal
and may have exposed themselves to liabilities on account of overly-broad opinions. See
generally Cheek, supra note 17, at 207-211.
44. It should be emphasized that section 11 does not prohibit every omission of a
material fact nor every untrue statement in a registration statement. The language is
quite specific:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading .... 1933 Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970).
An untrue statement will expose an individual to liability only if it concerns a material
fact. And only omissions of material facts which are either required to be stated (i.e.,
under the provisions of Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970), or the applicable SEC
regulation), or necessary to make the registration statement not misleading are action-
able. Furthermore, to be entirely accurate, section 11 does not prohibit such statements,
but only provides a cause of action for one who purchases a security pursuant to a
registration statement which is materially false or misleading. The prohibition of such
statements is included in section 24 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970), which
provides criminal penalties for "any person who willfully, in a registration statement
filed under this title, makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make statements therein not
misleading ...... It is interesting that the only prohibition of such statements in a
registration statement is phrased in terms of "willful" conduct; such language certainly
does not support the theory that there is an independent duty of due care on which
liability can be based.
45. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683, 689-92 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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bond counsel. Congress chose to grant a broad exemption from the
provisions of the 1933 Act for the issue or guarantee of a security by
any "political subdivision" or "political instrumentality" of a state.40
The registration statement and prospectus requirements of section 5 of
the 1933 Act are generally inapplicable to the issuance of municipal
securities; equally inapplicable are the section 11 and section 12 pro-
visions pursuant to which private civil actions lie.47
Section 17 of the 1933 Act. Congress, however, expressly
provided that the general anti-fraud provisions of section 17 (which
contain no express civil remedy) are applicable to offers and sales of
municipal securities.4 8 Under section 17, individuals are prohibited
from engaging in a variety of fraudulent practices in connection with
an offer or sale of any security. A person 49 may not use any device,
46. Section 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(2) (1970), exempts certain classes of
securities from the Act, except as otherwise expressly provided. Prominently included
among the exempt securities are "any security issued or guaranteed by. . . any political
subdivision of a State or territory, or by any public instrumentality of one or more states
or territories . . . ." With the exception of certain types of industrial development
bonds, see note 47 infra, this exemption covers all municipal securities.
The purpose of this exemption is indicated in the report accompanying the House
version of what ultimately became the Securities Act of 1933:
[The bill] carefully exempts from its application certain types of securities and
securities transactions where there is no practical need for its application or
where the public benefit is too remote. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1933).
47. The original House version of the 1933 Act did not exempt municipal securities
from the provisions of section 12. It was not until the conference committee met that
the exemption of municipal securities, as included in the Senate version, was secured.
Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House, H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 26-27 (Conference Report 1933).
Certain municipal securities in the nature of industrial development bonds may still
not be exempt from the registration and prospectus requirements of the 1933 Act. Under
SEC Rule 131, 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1976), municipal obligations which are payable
from funds obtained in payment for property or money used in an industrial or
commercial enterprise shall also be considered to be a separate security of the underlying
obligor (i.e., the commercial/industrial enterprise). Unless they qualify for a tax
exemption as industrial development bonds under sections 103(c)(4) or (6) of the
tax code, INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 103(c) (4), (6), such separate securities may be
non-exempt under the 1933 Act and subject to the provisions of sections 11 and 12.
See 1933 Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (1970).
Even if the industrial development bond can qualify for some other section 3
exemption, the underlying obligor and underwriter are unlikely to be satisfied without
opinion from independent counsel. Section 12 liability may still be possible inasmuch
as that section applies to all exempt securities other than those specifically exempted
under section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.
Because of the complexity of these tax and securities law provisions and regulations
which control industrial development bonds, underwriters and the underlying obligors
will frequently obtain independent counsel in such transactions.
48. 1933 Act § 17(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1970).
49. "Person" includes political subdivisions. See 1933 Act § 2(2), 15 U.S.C. §
77b(2) (1970).
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scheme or artifice to defraud; he or she may not obtain money from a
purchaser by untrue statements of a material fact or by a failure to state
a material fact which is necessary to make other statements not mis-
leading; and he or she may not engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which would operate to defraud a purchaser.50 While
authority is mixed on whether section 17 can be used to support a pri-
vate action for damages, 5 it seems clear that this section may be used
to subject bond counsel to SEC enforcement or disbarment proceedings
for improprieties in offers or sales of securities. 2
Thus, with only section 17 applicable to municipal bonds, the
1933 Act imposes no explicit duties on bond counsel. Nor are any
extensive duties to be inferred by analogy to provisions for registered
securities.
The 1934 Act. No more explicit guide to the duties of bond
counsel is provided by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Muni-
cipal bonds are generally exempt from the requirements of the 1934
Act,53 but, as with 1933 Act, the 1934 Act's anti-fraud provisions, con-
contained in section 10(b) and its companion, rule 10b-5, are applica-
ble to all securities including municipal bonds.54 Rule 10b-5 is similar
50. 1933 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Section 17(b), 15 U.S.C. §
77q(b) (1970), the "anti-tipster sheet" provision, also applies to sales of municipal
securities. This provision prohibits touting a security for a fee without disclosing that
the publisher has been paid to do so. This section has not been the source of much
reported litigation and, in any case, has little relevance to any problem bond counsel
might be expected to face. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1933).
51. See note 55 infra and cases cited therein.
52. See 1933 Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970); SEC Rules of Practice 201.2, 17
C.F.R. § 201.2 (1976).
53. See 1934 Act § 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
54. 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); Securities Exchange Act Rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). The 1934 Act's definition of "person" was spe-
cifically amended to include political subdivisions in 1975. Securities Reform Act of
1975 § 3(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c)(9) (Supp. 1976).
At least in theory, the Securities Exchange Act and all its provisions should have
little application to bond counsel. The 1934 Act was really not intended to regulate the
issuance of securities. Rather, the Act was intended primarily to regulate secondary
trading in issued securities, exchanges, brokers and dealers. Because bond counsel
performs services in connection with the issuance of the municipal security, and not its
subsequent trading, the 1934 Act should not, in theory, be a significant repository of
duties with respect to him. Yet courts rarely, if ever, seem to consider the limited
purpose of the 1934 Act as limiting the provisions of section 10 (and rule lOb-5 adopted
thereunder).
Recently, however, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the
Supreme Court expressly recognized the intended relation between the two securities
acts:
The Securities Act of 1933 . . . was designed to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in
commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of
1217
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
to section 17 of the 1933 Act in prohibiting fraudulent practices. 5 Rule
1Ob-5 applies more broadly, however, not simply to any offer or sale
but "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Since
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 have been held to give rise to a private
specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair
dealing. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933). The 1934
Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock
prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on compa-
nies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges. See S. REP. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934). 425 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added, citation
omitted).
Given the distinctly different purposes behind the statutes, and the provision of express
civil remedies in only the 1933 Act to cover public issuance of securities, there is a
strong argument against allowing rule lOb-5 to be used to imply additional civil remedies
for conduct occurring in securities issues regulated by the 1933 Act. In Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court, on its own
initiative, expressly recognized the existence of the argument that the 1933 Act's
remedies may be exclusive, but declined to rule on it. Id. at 733-34 n.6.
Even if the exclusivity of 1933 Act civil remedies is ultimately accepted, its
applicability to municipal security transactions would be in doubt because such securities
are not regulated by the 1933 Act, and hence no express remedies exist with respect to
such securities.
55. The similarity between section 17 of the 1933 Act and rule lOb-5 is, at first
reading, striking. Section 17 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Rule lob-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
So great is the similarity that some courts have erroneously concluded that there is an
identity between the two for purposes of testing the existence and scope of an implied
private remedy. See, e.g., MacAndrews & Forbes Co. v. American Barmag Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 1401 (D.S.C. 1972); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). This
view is incorrect. Legislative history amply demonstrates that Congress did not intend
that a private remedy would lie for violation of section 17; Congress expected, rather,
that the civil liabilities created by sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act would be sufficient
to make the 1933 Act enforceable. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1933). No such clear legislative limitation exists as to section 10 of the 1934 Act or
rule 10b-5. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1934). Nevertheless,
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cause of action for damages5" and since they have been held to apply
to the various participants in connection with securities transactions,"
this section and rule become a primary source of possible imposition
of securities law duties on bond counsel.
As will be shown, however, the text of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 are directed simply at prohibiting fraud or misleading represen-
tations. They impose no requirement of reasonable investigation such
as is required to establish the due diligence defense.
The Securities Reform Act of 1975 and the Tower Amend-
ment. The Securities Reform Act of 1975 confirmed Congress' intent
not to impose federal regulation on issuers of state or local government
securities. The Reform Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to require federal registration of municipal securities dealers and
brokers, 8 both of whom had previously been exempted from registra-
tion. To administer the new provisions, a Municipal Securities Rule-
making Board was also established with powers to regulate municipal
brokers and dealers.59
current authority is divided on the issue of whether a private right of action for damages
can be implied under section 17. See Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089,
1093-95 (ED. Pa. 1972). Courts have held both ways. Compare Reid v. Mann, 381
F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp.
890 (D. Me. 1971) (no private right of action under section 17(a)), and Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) (no right of action under
section 17(a) unless provided by sections 11 or 12), with MacAndrews & Forbes Co.
v. American Barmag Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1401 (D.S.C. 1972) (implies private cause
of action under both section 17(a) and section 10(b)); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp.,
336 F. Supp. 1089 (ED. Pa. 1972), and Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (implies right of action under section 17(a)). Thus far the Supreme Court has
avoided settling the issue. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 733-34 n.6 (1975).
The two sections also contain an important difference in wording. Section 17
applies to the "offer or sale" of a security. Although an actual sale is not necessary,
only actions by the seller are prohibited. Rule lOb-5, on the contrary, prohibits similar
behavior, but "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security. Thus, while both
buyer and seller are within the scope of rule lOb-5, there must be an actual purchase or
sale in order to have the rule apply. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975). In short, rule lob-5 needs a transaction, section 17 does not; rule
10b-5 applies to buyer and seller, section 17 to seller alone.
56. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
57. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-12 (1971).
See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (accountants); Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S.
929 (1976) (underwriters); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973)
(lawyer giving an opinion); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (issuers, controlling officers and shareholders).
58. Securities Reform Act of 1975 § 15B(a) (1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(a) (1) (Supp.
1976). For a detailed discussion of the effect of these amendments on participants in
municipal securities issues, see Comment, supra note 3, at 1270-74.
59. Securities Reform Act of 1975 § 15B(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b) (Supp. 1976).
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The 1975 legislation was specifically amended on the floor of the
Senate, however, to prohibit both the SEC and the Rulemaking Board
from requiring any issuer of municipal securities, either directly or in-
directly through a purchaser, to file any application, report or document
with the SEC or the Board prior to a sale of securities. 60 Under the
second provision of this so-called Tower Amendment, the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board is without power to require issuers to pro-
vide any information at any time to the Board or to purchasers."' The
SEC, however, has implicit authority to request information from an
issuer after its issue is completed. 62  The Board may also require
brokers or dealers, at any time, to file or provide purchasers with docu-
ments or information which are available from a source other than the
issuer."3 While the Board is empowered to promulgate rules regulating
a variety of broker-dealer activities,"4 neither it nor the SEC has estab-
lished any disclosure requirements for municipal securities official state-
ments.
Thus, the Tower Amendment has not led to substantial changes
in the law applicable to municipal issuers or bond counsel. Section
17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act still apply
to municipal bond sales. While neither the SEC nor the Board may
require a municipality to provide any information about its securities
prior to their sale, participants in municipal issues remain prohibited
from making false or misleading representations, or from omitting in-
formation needed to make representations not misleading. At most,
the SEC's asserted power to request information from municipal issuers
after their sale may facilitate prosecution of anti-fraud proceedings. 5
SEC Enforcement Powers
One final aspect of federal regulation which deserves special men-
The composition and powers of the Board are discussed in Comment, supra note 3, at
1272. See also Note, Disclosure by Issuers of Municipal Securities: An Analysis of
Recent Proposals, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1018-19 (1976).
60. Securities Reform Act of 1975 § 13B(d) (1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(d) (1) (Supp.
1976).




64. These permissible areas of regulation are discussed in Comment, supra note 3,
at 1272.
65. There are a variety of proposals presently before Congress which would increase
the powers of the Commission and/or Rulemaking Board, change the applicability of the
1933 Act to municipal securities, and/or legislate special disclosure provisions for
municipals. These proposals are discussed in Comment, supra note 3, at 1274-88. See




tion is the broad discretionary investigative and enforcement powers of
the SEC. Under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the SEC may begin
investigations whenever it believes that the securities laws or regula-
tions have been or are about to be violated. 6 The SEC has further
discretion to seek to enjoin persons believed to be violating or about
to violate the securities laws.67 The substantial enforcement power of
the SEC, and the apparent willingness of many courts to require less
than exacting standards in such enforcement proceedings, 8 is a source
of major concern to participants in security transactions. This concern
is particularly acute for lawyers since the mere initiation of such an ac-
tion may be very damaging to professional reputation. Moreover, un-
der SEC rules of practice, a lawyer may be suspended from practice
before the Commission when the SEC finds that he or she has violated
or has willfully aided or abetted a violation of the securities laws or
regulations.69 Bond counsel are subject to SEC scrutiny under the
anti-fraud provisions of section 17, section 10 and rule 1Ob-5. 7°
The focus, then, for consideration of the application to bond coun-
sel of either possible civil liability or of the enforcement powers of the
SEC must be on the anti-fraud provisions of the statutes. The judicial
and administrative interpretation given these provisions requires careful
review, and it is to this problem that we now turn our attention.
SECTION 17 AND RULE lOb-5 AS APPLIED TO LAWYERS
Understanding section 17 of the 1933 Act and section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act has proven extremely difficult. Each
was adopted as a broad prohibition of deceptive practices not otherwise
expressly prohibited.7' The language of each is therefore broad. 7"
66. 1933 Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970); 1934 Act § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970).
67. 1933 Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970); 1934 Act § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970).
68. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C.
1975) (reckless disregard); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (negli-
gence). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which involved a private
action, did not resolve the question of the standard of liability to be applied in an
SEC enforcement action. Id. at 193-94 n.12. See notes 97-99 infra and accompanying
text.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1976). Apparently, the SEC would apply standards in
its own disbarment proceedings that are different from those it has urged in injunctive
proceedings: an attorney may only be disbarred or suspended for aiding and abetting
when his or her conduct is "willful," id., while the SEC has urged a negligence standard
in injunction proceedings. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir.
1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 102-05 infra.
70. See SEC v. Ferguson, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974).
71. Consider, for example, the explanations of the purpose behind section 10 of
the 1934 Act offered in S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-9 (1934), and 78
CONG. REc. 2271 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Fletcher). The drafters referred to section
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Each provision has generated enormous differences over its meaning.
While prohibiting misrepresentations, these provisions do not explicitly
prescribe any standard of culpability. Such a standard, of course, is cru-
cial to the question of the exposure of bond counsel.
The Standard of Liability: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
Until recently, there had been nearly total disagreement among
the circuits concerning the standard of liability to be applied in actions
brought under rule lOb-5. The standard had ranged from "inten-
tional" conduct to "negligent" conduct and had included a "flexible"
standard to be applied on a case-by-case basis. 73  The Supreme Court
chose to end the nearly two decades of debate on the requisite degree
of fault under rule lOb-5 in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.74  The Sev-
10 as a "catch-all" which would allow the SEC "to deal with new manipulative
[or cunning] devices." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
72. The provisions of section 17 and rule 10b-5 are set forth in note 55 supra.
73. The standard varied widely and fluctuated, See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12, 197 n.17 (1976). For example, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals had seemingly rejected the possibility that a purely unintentional action might
violate rule 10b-5, and instead required the demonstration of some form of scienter.
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In the Seventh
Circuit the law had evolved to the point where negligent omission to act was sufficient to
constitute a violation of the rule. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d
1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit
finally concluded, in Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975), after futilely attempting to reconcile irreconcilable earlier
rulings, that some form of "conscious fault" was required. The Ninth Circuit, seemingly
weary of the fray, capitulated in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974),
and ruled that there was no fixed standard, but rather a flexible standard which would
depend upon the facts of each case. For the most part, commentators were, if anything,
less illuminating than the courts in discussing the scienter question, with the exception of
Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972), which exposed the
divergence between courts' purported application of a negligence standard and the actual
scienter each court was finding. In January of 1974, SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer,
Jr. alarmed many practitioners with a speech which predicted far-reaching due diligence
responsibilities for the attorney on the basis of interpretations of the anti-fraud provi-
sions. See Sommer, supra note 6.
74. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Other aspects of rule lOb-5 had been considered by the
Court starting in 1971. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971) (the "in connection with" requirement); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128 (1972) (the "reliance" element); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store,
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (the "purchase or sale" requirement). Prior to these decisions, no
Supreme Court decision had specifically addressed the elements of the implied private
cause of action despite its recognition by the lower courts since 1946, see Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and the tremendous case law,
comment and controversy it had generated.
1222
BOND COUNSEL DUTIES
enth Circuit had ruled that a claim for relief had been stated under
rule lOb-5 against an accounting firm where it was alleged that but for
a negligently performed audit, the accountants would have discovered
evidence leading to exposure of a fraud being consciously perpetrated
by the president of a brokerage house on his customers.7 5 Plaintiffs
had never claimed that Ernst & Ernst actually knew of the fraud or
knowingly acted to facilitate it. The Supreme Court reversed the Sev-
enth Circuit, holding that no private action for money damages would
lie in the absence of an allegation of scienter 7-- "a mental state em-
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." 77  The Hochfelder
Court also interpreted "manipulation" very narrowly as connoting "in-
tentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors
by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities. '78
The importance of this decision cannot be overemphasized.
Hochfelder firmly rejects an expansive view of rule lOb-5. Signifi-
cantly, in reaching its decision, the Court started with and relied heav-
ily upon the actual wording of both the section and the rule.79 Equally
important, the Court buttressed its decision by construing the 1933 and
1934 Acts together and by resort to available legislative history, both
of which strongly weighed against a negligence standard. 0
In Hochfelder, the Court explicitly declined to consider and de-
cide three important issues related to the scienter requirement. First,
the Court noted that its disposition of the case made it unnecessary
"to consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate
under the section and the rule."''8 Second, the Court declined to de-
cide whether "in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for
civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. ' 2 Finally, the Court re-
served the issue of "whether scienter is a necessary element in an action
for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.18 3
The concept of aiding and abetting, a curious form of secondary
liability, is derived from judicial construction of rule lOb-5. Neither the
language nor the legislative history of either securities act describes
75. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185
(1976).
76. 425 U.S. at 193.
77. Id. at 194 n.12.
78. Id. at 199.
79. See id. at 197-201, 212-14.
80. See id. at 195-201. See also id. at 212-14 (administrative history of the rule).
81. Id. at 192 n.7.
82. Id. at 194 n.12.
83. Id.
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"aiding and abetting" as giving rise to a private action.8 4 The concept
apparently found its way into rule 10b-5 civil actions from the Restate-
ment of Torts in the district court's decision in Brennan v. Midwestern
Life Insurance.5 Such an action requires a showing that a party vio-
lated the securities laws, and that the aider and abettor had knowledge
of that violation and knowingly and substantially assisted in its perpetra-
tion.80 The aiding and abetting concept appears to be intended to in-
culpate individuals on the periphery of a securities transaction, making
them share responsibility for conduct of the principals.8 7 Thus lawyers,
accountants, lending institutions and the like have all been charged
with aiding and abetting violations of rule IOb-5. s8
84. There is no mention of aiding and abetting anywhere in section 17 of the 1933
Act or the 1934 Act's section 10 or rule lOb-5. See generally Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari
Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972). Where
Congress wanted to forbid aiding and abetting security law violations, it did so explicitly.
See, e.g., 1934 Act § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C.A. § 771(b)(4)(E) (Supp. 1976). The
concept presently appears only in SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1) (iii)
(1976), governing suspension and disbarment of SEC practitioners. While aiding and
abetting clauses now seem commonplace in cases charging violations of rule 10b-5 or
section 17, there is judicial authority to the effect that aiding and abetting does not
give rise to a claim under sections 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act on the ground that to do so
would circumvent the express congressional provision of remedies. it re Equity Funding
Corp. of Am. Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Cal. 1976). By contrast, the
aiding and abetting theory has been employed to enjoin an attorney from violating sec-
tion 5(a) of the 1933 Act. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Finally, there is some au-
thority for the proposition that the controlling persons liability as set forth in section 20
of the 1934 Act may be the exclusive vehicle for imposing secondary liability. See
Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 168 (S.DN.Y. 1973), af 'd, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d
Cir. 1974).
85. 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), afi'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). The concept, as applied by the district court and accepted
by the court of appeals, was apparently borrowed from the RESTATEMENT OF TORTs §
876 (1939). See Ruder, supra note 84, at 620. The concept also has a criminal law
counterpart. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1970) (making an aider and abettor punishable as a
principal under federal criminal law).
86. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975). Woodward
contains the best discussion of aiding and abetting to be found in a judicial opinion.
87. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5(530) (1975).
88. See Keene Corp. v. Weber, 394 F. Supp. 787 (S:D.N.Y. 1971) '(claims of aiding
and abetting against lawyer dismissed with comment by court):
This case is indicative of an unfortunate tendency, which has become all too
prevalent, to proceed on speculative assumptions, in the absence of a sound
factual foundation, against professional men as aiders and abettors, for the
supposed in terrorem effect thereof due to the potentially coercive impact of
such a suit on their professional status and reputation. Id. at 789.
Additionally, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (accountants);
Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279
(9th Cir. 1971) (accountants); Fischer v. New York Stock Exchange, 408 F. Supp. 745
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stock exchange); Saltzman v. Zern, 407 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
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There has been disagreement among the lower courts concerning
the application of theories of aiding and abetting in both civil actions
and SEC injunction proceedings.89 Hochfelder, however, should abate
this controversy. If, as Hochfelder held, money damages lie only for
willful violations of the rule, it would hardly seem that one whose liabil-
ity is premised on aiding and abetting could be held liable for damages
under a less stringent scienter standard. Liability for an aiding and
abetting violation should only exist, if at all, where the alleged aider
and abettor had actual knowledge of a violation and knowingly pro-
vided substantial assistance in its perpetration. The curiousness of re-
quiring aiding and abetting allegations to meet this standard lies in the
fact that any such conduct will in and of itself directly violate rule
lOb-5. It is difficult to hypothesize a situation where all three elements
are satisfied without simultaneously hypothesizing an independent vio-
lation of one of the anti-fraud provisions of the rule. Indeed, it is pos-
sible that the Court's specific refusal to consider aiding and abetting
as a cause of action reflects its belief that the aiding and abetting theory
is misplaced in rule lOb-5 or section 17 securities litigation.
Of particular interest to bond counsel is the possible application
of a "reckless" or "wanton" standard to allegations that an attorney
aided and abetted a securities violation by performing legal services.90
Whenever an attorney's services are deemed necessary for the comple-
tion of a securities transaction, performance of those services may sat-
isfy the substantial assistance element for aiding and abetting if a se-
curities violation occurs in connection with the transaction. In such an
(bank); U.S. Steel v. Orenstein, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] CCH SEc. L. REP.
95,680 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); H.L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (supplier lending money to direct violator).
89. Compare SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975) (requiring that an aider and abettor have "general awareness that his
role was part of an overall activity that was improper"), with Woodward v. Metro Bank,
522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (requiring actual knowledge of the violation and
knowing and substantial assistance in its perpetration).
The criteria for aiding and abetting liability in the context of a civil damage action
may differ from those applied in an SEC enforcement proceeding. See notes 97-98 infra
and accompanying text. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc. [1976-1977 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [ 95,751 (1st Cir. 1976) (intent held irrelevant in an
SEC injunctive proceeding); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975);
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEC. L. REp.
f 95,722 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (scienter required).
90. However, because the concept of "reckless" or "wanton" manipulation or con-
trivance is as bizarre as "negligent" manipulation or contrivance, cf. Hochielder, 425
U.S. at 214, consistency with the decision suggests that the Court should reject any




event, the only significant issue left to be resolved would be the state
of mind of the attorney. Use of a "wanton" or "reckless" standard
might expose the attorney to liability for performing legal services even
though he or she knew nothing of the fraud. Under such an aiding
and abetting standard, a lawyer could incur liability for conduct which
is legal in and of itself-the issuance of a truthful opinion letter, for
example-if done in connection with a fraudulent securities transac-
tion, even though the attorney was in fact unaware of the fraud. By
refusing to decide whether allegations of reckless or wanton conduct
are sufficient to state a cause of action under rule 10b-5, the Supreme
Court failed to eliminate judicial second-guessing of participants in se-
curity offerings. As long as liability for money damages may be pre-
dicated on conduct that is short of intentional, the courts will be forced
to continue to permit juries to engage in "should have been" or "could
have been" reasoning.
Even this approach to aiding and abetting, however, would not
appear to impose general duties of investigation upon the attorney.
Rather, the attorney would be exposed to liability only after recklessly
or wantonly disregarding indications of fraud which arose in connection
with the performance of legal services and continuing to assist in the
fraudulent transaction. There is no indication that a duty to investigate
the total securities transaction to determine its soundness would be im-
posed. Indeed, such a rule would directly conflict with the 1933 Act's
careful limitations on liability."
The question of what constitutes reckless conduct has not yet been
settled. One possible approach might employ an analogy from the libel
decisions, an area of the law which is also concerned with the dissemi-
nation of false or misleading information. Under the current case law,
a person is held to have acted with "reckless" disregard for the truth
if he publishes defamatory matter under circumstances indicating its
probable falsity."2 According to the Supreme Court, this standard of
reckless conduct
is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have pub-
lished, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. 93
Recklessness is not to be inferred unless the allegations at issue "are
so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would put them into
91. See notes 29-45 supra and accompanying text.
92. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
93. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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circulation." 4 There ought to be "obvious reasons to doubt the vera-
city of the informant or the accuracy of his reports."9 5  Similarly, in
the securities law context, an individual should not be held liable for
reckless conduct unless he discloses information which is "so inherently
improbable that only a reckless man would put [it] in circulation."9
Unless a purchaser can point to obvious reasons for an individual to have
entertained serious doubts about the accuracy of information disclosed
in connection with a securities sale, that individual should not be held
responsible under rule 1Ob-5.
Finally, regardless of the outcome of the preceding two issues in
connection with civil remedies implied under rule 10b-5, the Supreme
Court has yet to establish a standard of fault for SEC enforcement pro-
ceedings. There is an impressive line of authority which holds that a
party may be enjoined on account of negligent violations of rule lOb-5
or section 17.11 Since the Hochfelder decision, at least three federal
courts have differed over the standard of fault to be applied in an in-
junctive proceeding by the SEC.98 While the maintenance of separate
and distinct requirements for actions for money damages and injunctive
proceedings would be more of an exercise in legerdemain than logic,
participants in securities transactions must recognize that this anoma-
lous situation is presently possible. The specific relevance of the con-
flicting pre-Hochfelder case law for the question of lawyers' liability is
discussed in detail below.9
While its holding that an action for money damages will not lie
under rule 10b-5 in the absence of an allegation of an intentional vio-
lation is extremely important, Hochfelder does not appear to have any
direct effect on previous decisions concerning the duties of lawyers un-
94. Id. at 732.
95. Id.
96. A similar analogy is appropriate to the recklessness standard in the aiding and
abetting context. An individual should not be held liable for reckless aiding and abetting
unless he acts in the face of a situation which is so likely to involve fraud that only a
reckless person would have facilitated its perpetration.
97. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Frank,
388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp.
641 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Rega, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
% 95,222 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
98. Compare SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 95,722 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (scienter required), with SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,751 (1st Cir.
1976) (intent held irrelevant in an SEC injunction action), and SEC v. Geotek, [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. RaP. 95,756 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (negligence
standard applied).
99. See notes 102-19 infra and accompanying text.
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der the anti-fraud sections of the securities laws. There have been few
reported cases in which an attorney was named as defendant to a pri-
vate action for damages brought solely under rule 1Ob-5 or section
17;100 there does not appear to be any reported decision in which an at-
torney was ultimately held liable for money damages in a private action
under rule 10b-5 or section 17. Thus, despite all the pre-Hochfelder
dicta and professional commentary on the expanding duties of the attor-
ney under the anti-fraud provisions, the much-heralded expansion
never achieved formal judicial sanction. In fact, the Hochfelder deci-
sion may be construed as an implicit affirmation by the Supreme Court
of those decisions which refused to hold the lawyer answerable in a pri-
vate action brought under the anti-fraud provisions.
The Standard for SEC Enforcement Proceedings
The attorney's liability in connection with the issuance of secu-
rities has been developed more thoroughly in the context of SEC en-
forcement proceedings.101 Because the Hochfelder Court did not es-
tablish a standard of liability for section 17 injunction proceedings, this
body of law retains precedential value. The leading case discussing
the attorney's liability in this context is SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,10 2 in
which the Second Circuit held that an attorney may be enjoined for
negligent violation of section 17 and rule lOb-5. According to the
court, "the public trust demands more of its legal advisers than 'cus-
tomary' activities which prove to be careless.' 0 3  In order to enforce
this standard against securities counsel, the Second Circuit suggested
that the SEC can seek to enjoin an attorney for the misleading use of
an opinion letter unless the lawyer can establish that he or she exer-
cised due care in providing the letter. Although the court's imposition
of a negligence standard on the attorney may seem threatening to the
bar, it should be emphasized that the duty imposed is narrowly drawn:
100. See Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Keene Corp. v.
Weber, 394 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F.
Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 271 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D.
Colo. 1965). No civil action under rule lOb-5 has been found which has proceeded
to judgment against attorneys who did no more than perform legal services.
101. See cases cited note 98 supra. See also United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854
(2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961).
102. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
103. Id. at 542.
The legal profession plays a unique and pivotal role in the effective implemen-
tation of the securities laws. Questions of compliance with the intricate pro-
visions of these statutes are ever present and the smooth functioning of the
securities markets will be seriously disturbed if the public cannot rely on the
expertise proffered by an attorney when he renders an opinion. . . . Id.
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The standard of culpability [the court finds] appropriate for the
author of an opinion letter in an action for injunctive relief only should
not be construed to apply to more peripheral participants in an illicit
scheme or, for that matter, to criminal prosecutions or private suits
for damages.' 0 4
Thus, Spectrum is limited to the attorney's responsibility for the accu-
racy of a legal opinion letter in the context of its issuance.'"6 The case
does not impose due diligence duties on an attorney with respect to
any other aspect of the securities transaction.
Other reported attorney injunction cases under rule lOb-5 and
section 17 have similarly restricted holdings. For example, in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp.,10 6 the district court, in rejecting
cross-motions for summary judgment, expressed willingness to enjoin
an attorney if he "actually knew that a fraudulent scheme was envi-
sioned by NSMC, or else recklessly ignored what should have been
readily apparent."'1 7  The court declined to consider whether mere
negligence would have been sufficient, since there was ample evidence
that the attorney had acted either recklessly or with knowledge. The
attorney in that case had supplied two opinion letters establishing the
effective date for the sale of a business enterprise. While the form of
the transaction may technically have constituted an effective sale on the
date so given, the transaction in substance was a sham. Since the attor-
104. Id.
105. Intimately connected with the section 17 or rule lob-5 injunction is the issue of
the propriety of injunctive relief. In other words, does the allegation of the violation in
the complaint raise sufficient likelihood of future violation to justify issuing the
injunction? If there is not sufficient basis to believe that an injunction is necessary, it
would seem appropriate to dismiss the complaint even though a hearing on the merits of
the charge is never reached. See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 402 F.
Supp. 641, 651-52 (D.D.C. 1975):
The ultimate question then presented is whether defendant's past conduct indi-
cates that there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated.
Neither the voluntary discontinuance of the activity, nor a declaration of an
intention to comply with the law in the future will preclude an injunction.
The Court must evaluate the sincerity of the defendant's assurances that he
will not again transgress. The fact that the defendant maintains his inno-
cence is a factor pointing to the need for an injunction. On the other hand,
the detrimental consequences that may flow to an attorney as a result of an
injunction and his subjective good faith in relying on the state of law as he
then perceived it are factors which militate against the grant of injunctive
relief.
Where the only basis for a claim of violation of the law is negligent conduct, it would
seem that the need for injunctive relief is the weakest. On the other hand, the more
deliberate the conduct, or the more frequent the violations, the greater the need for
injunctive relief. See also SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490-93 (2d Cir. 1968)
(standards for issuance of a temporary injunction).
106. 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975).
107. Id. at 650.
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ney had prepared essentially all of the papers effecting the transaction,
he could not ignore what he had learned when issuing his opinion letter
later on:
[T]his Court rejects the proposition that a member of the bar can
seek refuge behind a legal technicality, elevating form over substance,
when he is party to and familiar with the circumstances which indicate
that an illusory transaction is being undertaken which could be utilized
to mislead third parties. [The lawyer's] focus on the narrow legal ques-
tions on which he opined is unrealistic in view of his participation in the
total transaction which obviously had the possibility for misleading out-
siders.1 08
In other cases, lawyers have been enjoined after having issued false
statements while aware of facts which made it apparent that the state-
ments made were without basis.109
The common denominator in these SEC enforcement decisions is
an attorney's issuance of a statement which, in light of the facts as he
or she knows them, simply is not justified. The duty imposed by these
decisions is a limited'one. The attorney may not, in performing legal
services, make a statement which is without basis in the context of the
known facts. No case imposes a general duty to investigate the con-
duct of other parties to the transaction. But when, as a consequence
of performing legal services, the lawyer becomes aware of facts which
apparently contradict the premises underlying his or her conclusions,
continued adherence to those conclusions without investigation into the
apparent contradiction may expose the lawyer to enforcement proceed-
ings. It is also interesting to note that although these *decisions may
speak of imposing liability under a negligence standard, the actionable
conduct in each case went far beyond negligence and arguably was de-
liberate or intentional.
108. Id. at 648 (emphasis added).
109. SEC v. American Associated Systems, 482 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974) (corporate counsel prepared quarterly reports, registration
statement and prospectus, led discussion at shareholder meetings and in each instance
concealed financial problems experienced by company, and made false statements as to
business when he knew the truth); SEC v. Rega, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. RaP. 95,222 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (lawyer had represented to escrowee bank that
conditions to payment of escrowed funds had been met when lawyer "had no basis
whatsoever to make this representation and in fact his figures were erroneous at that");
SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH F-M.
SEc. L. REP. 1 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (attorneys' exemption opinion went "beyond
mere mistakes in legal judgment to constitute probable violations of the anti-fraud




No enforcement case extends the attorney's duty beyond responsi-
bility for matters relevant to his or her own work. Even where neg-
ligence is considered to be the proper standard, it is applicable only
to the lawyer's handiwork; the anti-fraud provisions have not been used
to impose responsibility for the accuracy of statements of others, at least
where the lawyer is not actually on notice of their falsity. In this re-
spect, the lawyer's duties under rule 1Ob-5 and section 17 are similar
to those under section 11 involving the accuracy of the registration
statement. In neither case does the attorney assume duties with re-
spect to anything other than his or her own work.
That the anti-fraud provisions impose no general affirmative duty
of diligence upon an attorney in connection with a securities issuance
is given additional support by the Supreme Court's post-Hochfelder
vacation and remand of the lower court's judgment in Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co."' In that case, the Seventh Circuit had ruled that "an
underwriter of short term commercial paper, who acted in the mis-
taken, but honest belief that the financial statements prepared by the
certified public accountants correctly represented the condition of the
issuer is liable to its customers for losses sustained as a result of the
issuer's default.""' Without citing any statutory language to support
its conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned that: "The underwriter
is under a duty to make at least some investigation directed at the ques-
tion whether the ever present possibility of fraud is in fact a reality. 11 2
The Supreme Court summarily vacated the judgment and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Hochfelder.13  Under Hoch-
felder, the failure to investigate another's actions or statements in the
transaction, without more, is neutral conduct. The decision not to in-
vestigate becomes significant only when the putative investigator knows
of fraudulent activity or of a misstatement or omission of a necessary
material fact. In such a case the decision not to investigate but to con-
ceal can itself become a direct violation of rule 10b-5(1) or (3). In
short, the result in Sanders is strong authority for the proposition that
rule 10b-5 does not itself impose a "due diligence" requirement.
Cases Involving Bond Counsel
Very little authority directly discusses the obligations of bond
counsel under the securities laws. There appear to be no reported ju-
110. 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 929 (1976).
111. 524 F.2d at 1066.
112. Id. at 1071.
113. 425 U.S. 929 (1976).
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dicial decisions on point. Several SEC enforcement proceedings have
named bond counsel but none contains substantial discussion of the
legal theories. The most significant case concerned a Kentucky lawyer
who, according to the SEC release, had not only served as bond counsel
but had assumed principal legal responsibilities for reviewing the pro-
spectus in a municipal issue. 1 4 The case, brought by the SEC in an
attorney disciplinary proceeding, was settled by a consent judgment.115
The SEC had found that the lawyer "willfully aided and abetted" vio-
lations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934
Act because the lawyer, on the basis of information actually in his pos-
session, "should have known, if he did not know, that the prospectus
omitted material facts."" 6  The SEC's order would seem to have de-
rived from the lawyer's additional undertaking to review the prospectus
and the fact that he was fairly on notice as to misleading statements.
It does not stand for the proposition that bond counsel generally has
the duty to conduct a thorough investigation into the accuracy of all
statements made in the offering circular.
It is interesting to note the curative steps which the lawyer's firm
was required to take under the consent order. Among other matters,
it was required to
. ..undertake an appropriate investigation in connection with acting
as bond counsel including, among other things, obtaining independently
audited financial statements and inquiring into the background of the
various parties connected with the offering . .. [and to] require that
it receive independently audited financial statements, representations
from appropriate interested persons concerning the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the statements about them in any offering circulars, and a
statement from counsel for any lessee or guarantor that such counsel
has reviewed the offering circular and is aware of no inaccuracies
therein.117
While this order clearly places the firm in the position of having to take
affirmative steps to avoid involvement in fraudulent deals, it is note-
worthy that the order does not require the firm to undertake a full ex-
amination of the accuracy of official statements similar to the examina-
tion of prospectuses undertaken in registered offerings.
114. SEC v. Ferguson, SEC Litigation Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974). See also
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1976) (allowing suspension or disbarment for willfully aiding and
abetting a securities violation), discussed in note 69 supra.
115. Ferguson, SEC Litigation Release No. 5523.
116. The order found that:
Because of his review of the prospectus, his pre-existing relationship with the
developer on other offerings of municipal bonds, and other factors which had
come to his attention, respondent should have known, if he did not know, that




During 1976 the SEC has named bond counsel as defendants in
two enforcement actions. It does not appear that any judgment con-
cerning bond counsel has been entered in either of these cases. The
accusations against bond counsel in these cases do not appear to be
based on failure to undertake a due diligence examination as to facts
stated in the official statement. In one involving fraudulent diversion
of bond proceeds, the bond counsel was charged with rendering a neg-
ligently false opinion as to taxability and knowingly giving the issuer
and a trustee incorrect advice concerning their duties to bondholders.118
In the other, the bond counsel is alleged to have made misrepresenta-
tions concerning his investigation of the validity of the issue and the
basis of his legal opinion." 9
In sum then, it would appear that not even an expansive reading
of the cases under the anti-fraud sections would impose a general duty
on bond counsel to examine the accuracy or completeness of the various
representations in the official statement. On the other hand, if bond
counsel should have actual notice of misleading statements in an official
statement, continued participation as bond counsel could well constitute
either a direct violation of rule 10b-5 or aiding and abetting another's
violation.
Less certain of resolution is the situation in which bond counsel
has neither actual notice of any misleading representation nor intention
to deceive, but is, nonetheless, assertedly "on notice" of a violation.
Under Hochfelder, the only possible private civil action under rule
10b-5 could arise when the defendant was reckless or wanton in disre-
garding actual evidence of a deceptive scheme or misleading represen-
tation. But if the negligence rule in Spectrum should prevail for SEC
enforcement actions, bond counsel could face an aiding and abetting
claim premised on negligent performance of their services. Such a
claim, however, would still have to be based on negligence in perform-
ing the services undertaken, and not on the general failure of bond
counsel to conduct a due diligence investigation of the official state-
ment.
DUTIES IN PRACTICAL SITUATIONS
The remaining portion of this Article will examine, in practical
terms, the effect of Hochfelder and existing enforcement cases on
118. SEC v. Astro Prods. of Kansas, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 7557 (Sept. 13,
1976).




municipal bond counsel's responsibilities and potential liabilities under
the federal securities laws. While it may be concluded that bond coun-
sel are not required to conduct a general investigation of the facts un-
derlying the representations in the official statement (the sales'docu-
ment used in municipal bond issues), 2 ' difficult practical ques-
tions remain as to when bond counsel may be said to be placed "on
notice" of securities law violations. If on notice, counsel may be in
risk of an aiding and abetting violation under Spectrum if they give an
approving opinion.
Two aspects of the problem deserve particular emphasis: the
questions of what circumstances fairly put bond counsel on notice of
a violation, and whether bond counsel is automatically on notice as to
certain representations contained in the official statement.
What Circumstances Place Bond Counsel
on Notice of Violations?
Two common situations illustrate problems that are likely to be
faced by bond counsel. In one case, the bond counsel has no know-
ledge of any fraudulent scheme or of any misleading material repre-
sentations in the official statement. Nonetheless, the bond counsel does
not have reason to believe either that any lawyer expert in such matters
has examined the official statement or that the underwriter has made
a due diligence examination. While the reverse situation-where
knowledgeable underwriter's counsel is involved-may be more com-
forting, it would still seem inappropriate that bond counsel should
be placed "on notice" for failing to require that a knowledgeable
lawyer conduct a thorough due diligence investigation. Even in
registered financings, there is no statutory obligation that any lawyer
do more than give an opinion as to the legality of the securities. Fail-
ure to require reasonable investigation of an official statement by out-
side lawyers or by the purchaser is not in itself a securities violation.
There is a violation only if the official statement is in fact misleading.
Unless there is some evidence that the statement is misleading, bond
counsel has no obligation to conduct or procure a reasonable investiga-
tion.
A somewhat more difficult and not wholly uncommon situation
arises when the bond counsel knows of no misleading statements in the
official statement but, as a knowledgeable securities lawyer, would be-
come aware upon review that the statement is less thorough than is cus-
120. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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tomary. Once again, however, bond counsel should not be considered
as being on notice of any possible violation. It is not a violation for
an official statement to be brief or even to omit important matters un-
less such omissions make the statement misleading. To be on notice
of a violation, counsel must be on notice of either the falsity of the rep-
resentations or the omission of facts needed to make the representa-
tions not misleading. It is not sufficient simply to know that potentially
relevant facts are omitted.
These two examples are very important in determining the extent
of bond counsel's responsibility. If bond counsel were to be on notice
of violations simply because certain other parties did not investigate
thoroughly or because disclosure was less thorough than customary,
they would be required in nearly every issue to insure that the
disclosure at least met their own standards of completeness and that
it had been subjected to expert legal review. This would make
bond counsel generally responsible for the official statement. Whether
or not this is good public policy, and it may well be that it is not,"'' it
is not mandated by the federal statutes or the present case law.
The Official Statement
There would appear to be certain aspects of the official statement
for which bond counsel may quite arguably be held to be on notice
of material misstatements. The official statement will almost always
contain a brief description of the legal opinion, the terms of the bonds,
and the provisions of certain underlying documents. While it may be
suggested that bond counsel has no duty to review the official statement,
it would not seem wholly unlikely, at least where a bond counsel has
had the opportunity to review the official statement, for a court to con-
clude that the job of giving the opinion includes ascertaining that
the client's public representations about bond counsel's work are ac-
curate.' 2 2  Thus, the descriptions of the nature of the legal opinion,
121. Two important factors militate against requiring bond counsel to be generally
responsible for official statements. First, such a requirement would force a bond counsel
firm to act as an expert in an area where it may have little or no expertise. Other
professionals are already involved in the municipal bond transaction who have the
expertise to engage in the kinds of investigations which would be necessary to insure the
completeness and accuracy of the official statement.
Second, the reliance of investors on their underwriters and of the underwriters and
investors on certified public accountants makes it more reasonable to place the require-
ment of due diligence investigation on these professionals. The substantial costs of plac-
ing any duty to investigate the completeness of official statements on bond counsel also
argue against such a result.
122. This would seem particularly appropriate where the issuer causes an official
1235Vol. 1976:1205]
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of the terms of the bonds, and of the authorizing documents are all
matters which it would be imprudent for counsel to ignore. The dan-
ger, of course, is that an attorney could be accused of negligence or
recklessness in allowing his or her own work product to be misrepre-
sented by the description.
It may seem obvious to suggest that bond counsel may be held to
be on notice as to the accuracy of the official statement's description
of its own legal opinion. However, in many official statements
the description of bond counsel's opinion is open to a much broader
reading than the opinion itself. It is not uncommon, for exam-
ple, for official statements to state that all legal matters incident
to the authorization and issuance of the bonds are subject to bond
counsel's approval. Such language does not make clear the na-
ture of the opinion. Of course, since the text of the legal opin-
ion is commonly printed on the bond itself, it might be difficult to con-
tend that a bondholder could be misled. Nonetheless, vague or overly
broad descriptions of the services performed by bond counsel may tend
to mislead purchasers as to the limited scope of the opinion. 2 3 Unless
they are willing to undertake an examination as broad as the description
of the opinion presented in the official statement, bond counsel would
be well advised to seek to avoid such expansive descriptions of their
services.
It would, indeed, seem more prudent for bond counsel to require
issuers preparing official statements to describe the proposed legal
opinion by stating both the limited nature of the examination to be
undertaken and the substance of the opinion. It may also be advisable
to follow the practice of some counsel who add, to the extent that it
is true, that bond counsel has not examined and will not opine as to
the accuracy or completeness of the official statement except as to the
summary of the terms of the bonds and of the principal transcript docu-
ments.
-12 4
statement to be prepared. In representing the issuer, bond counsel may be less obliged to
review an official statement that is prepared by the bond purchasers without the bond
counsel's participation. And as to selling papers prepared by purchasers other than the
representatives of the underwriter or by secondary market traders, bond counsel would
necessarily be without any responsibility since they have little control.
123. In SEC v. Reclamation Dist. No. 2090, SEC Litigation Release No. 7460 (June
22, 1976), the SEC appears to have charged bond counsel with misrepresentation and
omissions concerning the lawyer's investigation and the basis upon which the legal opin-
ion was issued.
124. Statutory liability for misrepresentations in prospectuses cannot be disclaimed
and to attempt such a disclaimer may be misleading. SEC Release No. 33-3411, 2 CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 9 25,095 (195 1). This would not, however, appear to prohibit counsel
from stating the limited nature of an investigation.
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Bond counsel may also be considered on notice of misstatements
in the official statement which concern the terms of the bonds them-
selves or the authorizing ordinance or indenture, since these are instru-
ments which are normally drafted or at least closely examined by bond
counsel. If these parts of the official statement appear on their face
to be wrong or to omit matters required to make them not misleading,
bond counsel might find it similarly difficult to argue that it was not
on notice as to such inaccuracies.
The question of whether bond counsel could be held on notice
as to other representations in the official statement which are ques-
tionable on their face is more difficult. Must bond counsel review all
statements in the official statement to see if they are consistent with
his or her understanding of the situation? Obviously, no clear answer
can be given. Such an examination is beyond the scope of the bond
counsel's work and may well concern matters not within a lawyer's com-
petence. Bond counsel are not generally responsible for representa-
tions in an official statement which they did not draft and are not em-
ployed to investigate. Moreover, no case holds that any such duty ex-
ists. In the case of a registered security, the 1933 Act does not impose
the liability of an expert on lawyers other than as to the referenced le-
gal opinions. It is therefore reasonable to argue that bond counsel has
no duty to examine other representations in the official statement.
The risk remains, nonetheless, that the lawyer could be accused
of closing his or her eyes to violations in choosing not to review the
official statement for facial inaccuracies. Prudent counsel should there-
fore review the official statement to see if it gives any clear notice on its
face of material misrepresentations. 12 5 Once again, it is important to
distinguish such a facial review from a due diligence investigation of
the facts underlying representations made in the official statement.
As a result of consultations with the issuer, bond counsel may
on occasion become aware of matters which require disclosure. In
such a case, the lawyer would have an obligation to advise the client of
this requirement and to review the official statement for compliance.
In considering what places a lawyer on notice of violations, one
must keep in mind that the cases suggest a rather rigorous test as to
notice. Injunctions have been entered against lawyers only where
there were strong indications of actual knowledge of facts suggesting
the fraudulent nature of the scheme. Of course, there are limits to
the extent to which this analysis may prevail. An official statement
125. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
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may well be so poorly constructed, or so wholly incomplete, that it will
appear misleading on its face. While it will undoubtedly be difficult
to decide when this is the case, bond counsel should attempt to avoid
giving an approving opinion where he or she has reviewed an official
statement on its face and found it to be so insufficient as to be likely
to mislead.
CONCLUSION
Historical development has created a unique role for bond counsel
in municipal securities transactions. As special counsel in a munici-
pal issue, bond counsel have only a limited responsibility: they opine
only as to the validity and tax-exempt status of the municipal securities
under consideration. Given this narrow responsibility, the securities
laws do not require bond counsel to conduct a general due diligence
investigation of non-legal matters included in a municipal security of-
ficial statement. While as a matter of prudence bond counsel may re-
quire an official statement to summarize their own work accurately,
they should not be held responsible for a due diligence-type inves-
tigation of the statement or for policing the accuracy of its representa-
tions. In short, the securities law duties of bond counsel do not extend
beyond responsibilities for matters relevant to the specific work for
which they are retained.
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